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a member of the family of the parent on whom the obligation is sought
to be imposed. 29 These qualifications are not a precedent to statutory
liabilities and are not required in the greatest number of cases decided
on general principles.
CONCLUSION
In view of the many well settled decisions on the subject and the
various statutes in effect in many states, it is clear that in the vast.majority
of jurisdictions the tendency is to impose upon the parent the duty to
support an adult incapacitated child who cannot maintain himself. Such
an expansion of liability is based either upon a construction of statutory
law or a judicial expansion of common law.
29Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S.W. 541 (1925); Blachley v. Laba, 63 Iowa
22, 18 N.W. 658 (1884).
THE REQUIREMENT OF SCIENTER
IN OBSCENITY STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
To the practitioner and law student, the state of mind of the accused
at the time the activity in question occurred is a vital factor in determin-
ing criminal liability. In most instances determining the necessity, nature
and existence of the mens rea is a perplexing problem in research, investi-
gation and mental gymnastics. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate
the mental element in statutes and ordinances pertaining to First Amend-
ment rights; specifically, statutes and ordinances dealing with the control
of distribution of obscene material.
Blackstone spoke of "vicious will" and a consequent unlawful act as
constituting a crime.' The United States Supreme Court has said: "The
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence."'2 Black's Law Dictionary
succinctly defines mens rea as a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful pur-
pose; a criminal intent.8 Judge Learned Hand defined mens rea in United
States v. Crimmins.4
Ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless he is aware of the existence
of all those facts which make his conduct criminal. That awareness is all that
is meant by the mens rea, the 'criminal intent,' necessary to guilt, as distinct
from the additional specific intent required in certain instances ... and even
this general intent is not always necessary.5
I Blackstone's Commentaries, Bk. 4, p. 294 (1889).
2 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
3 Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (3rd ed., 1933).
4 123 F.2d 271 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941). 5 Ibid., at 272.
COMMENTS
Judge Hand's definition is excellent because it is descriptive and work-
able. It clearly states what the law requires in most cases and then states
that this requirement need not always be present.
CRIMES MALA PROHIBITA
A mental element is not required for conviction for crimes mala pro-
hibita. In Morissette v. United States,6 Justice Jackson, expressing the
unanimous opinion of the Court, gives an excellent explanation of crimes
where no mental element is involved. He traces the history and develop-
ment of such crimes both here and in England. 7 Justice Jackson attributes
this tendency to call into existence new duties and crimes which disregard
any mental element to the industrial revolution, mass transportation, and
urbanization. Mechanization plus crowded highways and congested liv-
ing conditions created new duties which lawmakers imposed on the
populace by means of regulations invoking criminal sanction.
Morissette also points out that penalties for violation of such laws are
relatively small and there is no great damage to one's reputation caused
by a conviction for such an offense. Therefore, since damage to a violator
is not of an extremely serious nature, courts have been inclined to dis-
pense with the need for intent where statutes and regulations make no
mention of it and have held that the guilty act alone constitutes the
crime.8 The rationale of such statutes and regulations is found in United
States v. Dotterweicb,9 where in referring to legislation dispensing with
need of awareness of some wrongdoing the Court said: "In the interest
of the larger good, it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person
otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger."1 0
MALA PROHIBITA AND OBSCENITY
In recent years governmental bodies within the United States have
become concerned with the widespread distribution of obscene mate-
rials. In attempts to check this distribution, so as to prevent the under-
mining of public morals, lawmakers have found it convenient to dis-
pense with the mental element in statutes and regulations dealing with
obscenity. Although this is a logical step in the development of public
welfare offenses, it presents the problem of being a substantial restriction
on freedom of speech.
6 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
7 For a detailed analysis, consult: Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55
(1933).
8 For an excellent discussion of crimes mala prohibita consult: Clark and Marshall
on Crimes, c.5, §5.10 (6th ed., Wingersky, 1958).
9 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 10 Ibid., at 281.
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The City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance dispensing with the ele-
ment of scienter, knowledge by booksellers of contents of books, and
imposing a strict criminal liability on booksellers for possessing obscene
materials." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a bookseller,
Eleazar Smith, under this ordinance. 12 In reversing, the Court said that
such an ordinance was unconstitutional in that: "By dispensing with any
requirement of knowledge of the contents of the book on the part of the
seller, the ordinance tends to impose a severe limitation on the public's
access to constitutionally protected matter."' 3 The limitation on free
speech was present because, to avoid liability under the ordinance, book-
sellers would tend to sell only what they have read, and as a result, the
distribution of constitutionally protected matter, as well as obscene mat-
ter, would be impeded. Therefore, constitutionally protected material
that the bookseller had not read, would also not be sold. Such a result,
of course, is repugnant to American constitutional law. The Court could
not allow an infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed
rights where that citizen had an innocent mind, especially when to in-
fringe that right might tend to inhibit the dissemination of information
and ideas.
The decision in the Smith case is based on the Court's prior decision in
Wieman v. Updegraff.14 There, the Court held an oath pertaining to
freedom from past membership in subversive groups as prerequisite to
state employment unconstitutional, because the oath made no distinction
between members who, at the time of membership, had no knowledge of
the groups' character and those members who knew the nature of the
group. The Court said that scienter was of vital necessity in such cases.
To dispense with it violates a basic right of citizens of a democracy.
Though the Court admitted that state employment was not a matter of
right, they would not allow an individual to be barred from such em-
ployment for an innocent association with a subversive group. The Court
also believed that the city and state courts would not construe, nor had
they in the past construed, the oath as adversely affecting those persons
who, during their membership in the proscribed organizations, were
11 §41.01.1 of the Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles states: "Indecent
Writing, . . . Possession Prohibited: It shall be unlawful for any person to have in
his possession any obscene or indecent writing, book, pamphlet, picture, photograph,
drawing, figure, motion picture film, phonograph recording, wire recording or tran-
scription of any kind in any of the following places: . (various types of stores, and
stores located in certain places are thereafter listed).
12 Smith v. California, 161 Cal. App.2d 860, 327 P.2d 636 (1958), rev'd Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
'3 Ibid., at 153.
14 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
COMMENTS
unaware of its purpose. Great confidence was expressed by the Court
as to its belief that the ordinance would continue to be so read in order
to avoid raising difficult constitutional problems which any other ap-
plication would create.
Other cases dealing with oaths unquestionably show the Supreme
Court's demand for scienter in statutes and ordinances affecting basic
rights. An oath similar to the one in the Wieman case was held valid in
Garner v. Los Angeles Board.15 However, the Court specified that it up-
held the oath and the ordinance providing for it, only because the
Justices assumed that scienter was implicit in each clause of the oath. A
similar oath required for schoolteachers in New York was upheld by the
Court because the New York courts had construed the statute to require
knowledge of organizational purpose before the regulation could apply. 6
In a case involving a Maryland statute requiring a like oath of persons
who sought places on the ballot, the Court held the statute constitu-
tional.' 7 The decision was based on a promise made by the Maryland
Attorney General during oral argument that he would inform the proper
state officials that the element of scienter would be required and on a
Maryland Court of Appeals decision interpreting the statute as requiring
knowledge.
Another case along the same lines was Sbelton v. McKinley.' s There, a
state statute barring from state employment members of the National
Association for Advancement of Colored People was held invalid because
the statute made no requirement of knowledge of the organization's
nature.
It is easily discernible that any sort of legislation affecting freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment will require the inclusion of a mental
element. The Supreme Court has demanded such an element in cases
pertaining to a citizen's right to become a member of an organization
and in at least one case affecting a citizen's right to possess and distribute
books. In light of the Smith case it seems that legislation directed at
obscene materials will not be able to take advantage of the trend toward
eliminating the mental element from statutes aimed at promoting the
public good. 19 This inability flows from the rationale of crimes mala
15 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
16 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
17 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) per curiam.
18 174 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Ark., 1959).
19 Chicago v. Capitol News Agency, 59 S 21907 (Mar., 1960). The City of Chicago
sought a temporary injunction to restrain distribution of alleged obscene material as
provided in a Chicago ordinance. The Superior Court of Cook County denied the
injunction, struck the complaint and declared the Chicago ordinance unconstitutional
because it made no provision for scienter on the part of the distributor.
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probibita as recited in Dotterweich. It states that such legislation places
the burden of acting at hazard upon persons otherwise innocent but in
a responsible relation to public danger in the interest of the larger good.
The larger good in cases involving freedom of speech and press are these
very freedoms which are the life-blood of a democratic form of govern-
ment. To endanger them, in order to protect ourselves from materials
which should be recognized as valueless would indeed be a bad bargain.
The Supreme Court did not allow our nation to make such a compromise
with itself.
CONCLUSION
What is the solution to the perplexing problem of controlling the
distribution of obscene material and at the same time preventing in-
fringement of basic constitutional rights? The courts cannot ordinarily
allow slight infringements to be made on freedom of speech and press
by legislation because slight infringements make major ones a bit more
acceptable. The members of the Supreme Court recognized this danger
in Roth v. United States20 when speaking of freedom of speech and
press it said: "Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their
erosion by Congress or by the States. The door barring federal and
state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly
closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent en-
croachment upon more important interests. '"21 Mr. Justice Black, con-
curring in Smith, deals with these slight infringements far more harshly
when he says: "Censorship is the deadly enemy of freedom and progress.
The plain language of the Constitution forbids it. I protest against the
judiciary giving it a foothold here. '22 Therefore, if the courts will not
allow our lawmakers to protect us in this area who will protect us? The
answer is simple. We must protect ourselves. Freedom creates responsi-
bility. Liberty imposes duties. For, if we want freedom, we must prove
we are capable of being free.
20 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21 Ibid., at 488.
22 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959).
